This paper provides an analysis of legal insider trading on the Euronext Amsterdam stock exchange by using data published in the register held by the AFM, the dutch financial markets authority. The sample includes 822 transactions executed by corporate insiders between the beginning of January 1999 and the end of September 2005. Our analysis shows that the financial markets' response is not significant for purchases, and that the abnormal returns associated with the sales do not have the expected sign. However, over a longer time horizon, the average cumulative abnormal returns are positive for the stocks purchased, and negative for stocks sold by insiders. This result suggests either that insiders use long-term information for their trading activities or that they are able to time the market.
INTRODUCTION
Insider trading regulation plays an important role in economies with developed stock markets. According to Battacharchya and Daouk (2002) , 87 out of 103 countries with stock markets have insider trading laws, 38 of which have taken enforcement measures. One interesting aspect of these regulations is that they allow insiders to trade in their own companies' stocks, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. Such transactions are referred to as legal insider trading. For example, under US securities laws, legal insider trading occurs on a daily basis, as corporate insiders -officers, directors or employees -buy or sell stock issued by their own companies. One constraint is that the insiders concerned have to report these trades to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): once the trades are completed, filings have to be sent to the SEC which makes them public.
The well-known debate. The question whether insider trading should be regulated has been deeply debated in the literature. This is certainly due to the fact that corporate insiders are the persons most likely to possess privileged information regarding their company, and are therefore able to realize abnormal profits on the financial markets at the expense of outside investors. Critics of insider trading regulation mainly argue that restrictions are inefficient because insider trading allows new (private) information to be priced more quickly. As a result, stock prices reflect intrinsic firm value more accurately, promoting improved economic decision-making and resource allocation (e.g., Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Leland, 1992) . On the other hand, those in favor of insider trading regulation essentially claim that prohibition promotes public confidence and participation in the stock market and allows outsiders to share in value-enhancing events on an equal footing (Ausubel, 1990) .
In recent decades, the academic literature mainly within the US context has dealt extensively with the economic and financial analysis of legal insider trading. Without being exhaustive, topics such as the contribution of insider trades to market efficiency (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee; 2001; Aktas et al., 2007) , the market-timing capacity of insiders and their stock price predictive ability have attracted a great deal of attention (see Jenter (2005) or Piotroski and Roulstone, (2005) ).
Short term studies.
A number of studies also appraise the impact of insider trading activities over a shorter period. Seyhun (1986) , Lakonishok and Lee (2001) , and more recently Aktas et al. (2007) provide short-term event study results on US legal insider trading.
They observe statistically significant, but economically unimportant market movements around insider net purchase and net sale days. For example, Aktas et al. (2007) report, using a sample of 59,244 aggregated daily insider trades, statistically significant five-day abnormal returns of 0.417% and 0.225% for net purchases and net sales, respectively. It is important to stress that these small returns could be considered as economically significant, given that these trades contain transactions that are uninformative as well as others that do contain private information.
Long term studies.
There is overwhelming evidence in the literature that portfolios that are long on stocks purchased by insiders and short on stocks sold by insiders outperform the market over a time horizon ranging from one month to several months (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986 and 1998; Lin and Howe, 1990; Jeng et al., 2003) .
3 However, it is important to note that the reported abnormal performance seems to be driven by latent risk factors such as size, earnings/price or book-to-market (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001 ).
As mentioned above, previous researches mainly focus on US legal insider trading.
They are based on the insider transactions notified to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Insider trading in Europe has been the subject of only few comparable studies.
One of the main reasons remains the lack of European data. Only until recently, the majority of European countries did not have a legal obligation of notification for insider transactions. For the purpose of these prohibitions, inside information must be interpreted as information of a precise nature which has not been made public, and which relates -directly or indirectly -to one or more issuers of financial instruments and which would have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments if it were made public.
In order to obtain transparency with regard to the transactions conducted by insiders, and in order to examine whether or not these transactions are conducted using inside information, Directive 2003/6/EC obliges certain insiders to notify the competent authorities of the transactions they conduct on their own account in the stock of the company to which they relate. The insiders subject to this obligation are the persons who discharge managerial responsibilities within an issuer of financial instruments as well as persons closely related to the latter. insiders -are subject to the same obligation. Finally, corporate bodies, trusts or personal companies that are controlled or managed by the aforementioned persons or that are set up for the benefit of these persons or the economic interests of which are equivalent to those of these persons are also subject to the obligation of notification.
Under the previous legal regime, the personal scope of the obligation of notification was somewhat different: apart from the directors and commissioners of the issuing institution and their relatives, the directors and commissioners of significant legal entities in which the issuing institution holds participation were also subject to the obligation. Further, persons holding more than 25% of the capital of the issuing institution -as well as their administrators and commissioners if this person was a company or a corporate body -were obliged to notify their transactions. Relatives of the aforementioned two categories were equally subject to the obligation, as were members of the works council of the issuer. Finally, the issuing institution itself was subject to the obligation of notification.
US law also imposes an obligation of notification upon insiders. Without going into detail, this obligation principally regards officers and directors, as well as beneficial owners.
As 'officers' must be considered -amongst others -the president, the principal financial and accounting officers, any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division or function, as well as any other officer or other person who performs policy-making functions.
A 'beneficial owner' is a person holding more than 10% of a class of registered equity securities, such as common stock or registered preferred stock. (Hazen, 2005) The Transactions that Must Be Notified
Under current Dutch law, the aforementioned persons must notify transactions (1) in stocks that regard their own company and that are allowed to be traded on a regulated market, as well as (2) transactions in securities the value of which is determined by the value of the aforementioned stocks, i.e. call and put options, warrants and convertible debentures. Under the previous legal regime, the obligation of notification more generally envisaged transactions in securities that regarded the issuer.
US law obliges officers, directors and beneficial owners to file changes in their ownership of any class of any registered equity security of the issuer, as well as any purchase or sale of a security-based swap agreement involving such security.
The Delay of Notification
Under current law, the notification must be filed to the AFM at the latest on the fifth working day after the transaction date. A five-day period may be considered as rather long, certainly in comparison with the delay of two business days that is applicable in the United
States since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act came into effect (Hazen, 2005) . In the period from The fact that a transaction does not come within the scope of application of the insider trading prohibition, i.e. the prohibition from using inside information when conducting a transaction, does not imply that such a transaction is automatically exempted from notification to the AFM (see Grundmann-van de Krol (2004) and Schutte (2006) .
US law provides for various exceptions to the reporting requirement. For instance, transactions effected in the framework of a distribution of securities where the insider acquires the securities for the purpose of distributing them are exempted from the reporting requirement. Further, there are exemptions from the reporting requirement for stock splits, stock dividends and for rights issued pro rata. (Hazen, 2005) Delay of Six Months under US law
The aforementioned US reporting obligation for officers, directors and beneficial owners is included in Section 16 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Apart from the filing requirements, this section also imposes a short-swing prohibition: insiders must disgorge to the issuer any profit realized as a result of a purchase and sale of equity securities within a six months period. In practice, this means that if an officer, director or beneficial owner purchases relevant stock he must wait at least six months before reselling this stock in order not to incur liability (Hazen and Ratner, 2006) . No similar waiting period for insiders who have conducted a transaction in relevant financial instruments is provided for under European or Dutch law.
MARKET REACTIONS TO INSIDER TRADES ON EURONEXT AMSTERDAM Data and Method
We use the database of the Dutch financial markets authority (AFM) to extract notified corporate insider purchases and sales. For each transaction, this database indicates the name of the insider, the transaction date, the type of the transaction (sale or purchase), the price at which the transaction was concluded and the number of shares exchanged. To ensure the quality of the gathered data, we applied several filter rules to our initial sample. We only kept stock transactions realized by corporate insiders. We deleted transactions the prices of which were not reported in the AFM database or the prices of which were not in EUR. We eliminated any transaction in shares that are not listed on Euronext Amsterdam. The application of these filters reduced the sample size to 2,549 transactions. Moreover, we cross-checked the AFM price and volume information against that reported by the Datastream database. Doing so, we dropped from the sample records with a price outside the range of prices of that day, as well as records with a volume exceeding the number of shares exchanged on that day. As a last filter, we excluded transactions of less than 100 shares in order to focus only on the more meaningful events. Our final sample encompasses 822 transactions.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Since several transactions for a given company in the sample were realized at the same date, we have computed the net transactions using the same method as in Fidrmuc et al. (2006) . For example, a purchase of 400 shares and a sale of 220 shares on a given day become a net purchase of 180 shares for that day, and a purchase of 210 shares and a sale of 400 shares become a net sale of 190 shares. Following this adjustment and the elimination of net transactions with a compensated volume or value of zero we reduced our sample from 822 to 600 transactions on the basis of the net volumes and to 602 on the basis of the net values.
The remaining transactions include 163 net purchases (both in volume and in value), 439 net sales in value and 437 net sales in volume.
Empirical Method
To measure the market reaction around insider transaction dates we perform a classic event study. We compute the daily abnormal returns (AR) as in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Aktas et al. (2007) using the Beta-one model, which consists of subtracting the daily market portfolio return from the daily return for each company. We use the daily 'All Shares' index of Euronext Amsterdam as a proxy for the market portfolio. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as follows:
where R i,t and R M,t are the observed return for stock i and for the market portfolio, respectively. The cumulated abnormal return (CAR) is simply the sum of the daily AR over the different considered event windows. The event windows are defined relative to the insider trading days (day 0).
Results
Summary statistics. The average number of stocks purchased is inferior to that of the sales. It is well-known that corporate insiders are on average net sellers, probably for reasons of diversification (see a.o. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) In Table 2 we also provide two ratios to analyze the relative size of the insider transactions. The first one is the ratio of the insider net transaction to the volume of the corresponding day, and the second one is the ratio of the net insider transaction to the market capitalization of the corresponding day. For the net purchases and net sales, the insider transactions amount on average to 12.09% and 13.38% of the daily volume exchanged, respectively. Relative to market capitalization of the firm, the average ratio is 0.04% for the purchases, and 0.08% for the sales.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Market reactions. Table 3 displays market reactions to insider net purchases and sales around the transactions dates. For the entire sample, the two-day (CAR -1,+1 ) and five-day (CAR -2,+2 ) abnormal returns for the purchases are on average -1,20% and -0.92%, respectively. These CARs are not statistically significant. However, the CARs during the three days as of the transaction date (CAR 0,+2 ) and during the two days after the transaction (CAR +1,+2 ) are positive (0.39% and 0.74%, respectively) with the latter CAR being statistically significant at the 10% level. These results suggest that the market does not react on insider purchase days, but that the significant impact appears only during the subsequent two days. Since during the period under examination some categories of insiders (directors and commissioners of the issuing institution) were obliged to notify the AFM without delay, these ex post positive CARs could be explained by a buying pressure caused by other investors upon receipt of the information on the notification.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
For the net insider sales, the average five-day CAR around the transaction date is 0.97%, and it is significant at the 1% level. Even if it is well-known in literature that insider sales are more likely to be driven by other motives (such as diversification and liquidity reasons) than private information, this result is quite puzzling. One possible explanation is that insiders are more willing to sell stock when the market is dominated on the buy side, probably due to a positive (value creating) public announcement. Consistent with this idea, Huddart et al.
(2007) document in the US context that insiders seem to sell after good news earnings announcements. On the other hand, the CARs observed within a period of three days as of the date of the sale (-0.19%) and during the two days following the transaction date (-0.31%) are negative, but without being statistically significant.
Overall, as do previous US studies, our results show that the market reactions around the insider transaction date are too small to be economically significant.
In Panel B of Table 3 we have also explored the effect of transaction size by calculating the average CAR as a function of the trade size. Unlike the observations in some US studies, the market impact does not seem to increase with trade size. For purchases, only the average CAR over the two days subsequent to the insider trading days is positive and statistically significant. The corresponding abnormal return is 2.29%. This result is consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis of Kraakman (1991) according to which insiders try not to alert the market (Friederich et al., 2002) [Insert Figure 1 about here]
We have also computed the average CAR over longer event windows to check whether insiders use long-term information. Figure 1 displays both for purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B) the average CAR from day +3 to day +200 relative to the insider trading day (which corresponds to day 0). For the purchase, we obtain an average CAR of 6.73%, while it is -14.91% for the sales. Both abnormal returns are statistically significant (see Table 4 ).
Moreover, the more informative insider trades seem to be the smaller the transactions (where the trade size in value is below the first quartile) are. The corresponding CARs are 7.90% and -20.20% respectively for the purchases and sales. These results suggest that on average insiders' transactions rely on long-term information and/or insiders have market timing skills.
Moreover, since the maximum delay for the notification is 40 days after the transaction day and since an important proportion of the cumulative abnormal returns seems to be realized after day +40 (see Figure 1 and Table 4 ), outsiders mimicking insiders may also be able to realize an abnormal performance.
CONCLUSION
Public confidence in the integrity of the financial markets is crucial for the development of these markets. That is the reason why developed countries constantly introduce and improve regulations that envisage the preservation of this public confidence and the protection of the financial markets against abuse and manipulation. The regulation of insider transactions forms part of these measures and envisages the prohibition of operations conducted by corporate insiders on the basis of private information.
In several countries, insider trading regulation implies an obligation to notify any transaction conducted by a corporate insider. This measure allows using stock price reactions an examination of the motives behind those transactions and provides the other investors in the market with a source of potential information. As a consequence, the information content of the transactions notified by insiders has been the subject of intense analysis in literature.
Consistent to a large extent with previous literature, short-term abnormal returns associated with insider trades on Euronext Amsterdam are either non-significant or ambiguous. It is important to note that short-term abnormal returns are only a very noisy proxy for private information revelation in the context of insider trading. According to Aktas et al. (2007) this is mainly due to two shortcomings. The first relates to the probable endogenous relation between abnormal returns and insider trading: insiders may decide to purchase on a specific day because they expect stock prices to increase on that day. The second shortcoming results from the fact that insiders can act strategically by timing the market, and can voluntarily choose a trading window in which they can hide their motivation for trading.
However, using longer event-windows, we are able to show that the adjustment of the stock prices is notable and has the right direction. This suggests that insiders either have some market timing ability and/or use long-term information. The notification process seems to provide outsiders with an important source of information. However, to ensure that the excess returns are not simply a compensation for risk, more data are needed to perform a more sophisticated significance test while controlling for known priced factors in the market (e.g., such as beta, size, book-to-market, momentum). This is left for further research. Fig. 1 . Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from day +3 until day +200 relative to the insider trading day, which is day 0. Small trades are trades the size in value of which is below the first quartile. Large trades are the ones the size in value of which is above the third quartile.
